Russian oil supply tensions continued to escalate after November 21
Russian crude oil exports by sea soared in October, reaching the highest level since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine at nearly 4 million barrels per day. Lower refineries operate amid maintenance and Ukrainian drone strikes freeing up more crude supplies for export.
However, with the expiry of the Lukoil and Rosneft sanctions deadline on November 21, Russian crude is likely to face increased logistics, adding pressure to already weak seaborne export volumes in November.
Greece’s participation in Urals trade fell to its lowest level in 16 months
After the highest figure in October, total seaborne crude oil/condensate exports fell by 20% month-on-month (1-24 November). This figure is 5% lower yoy and 3% lower than the average for November 2016-2024.
Slower Ural loadings in November weighed on exports overall, with exports falling by 25%. Notably, the involvement of Greek operators in Urals trade decreased by almost 15 percentage points in November amid sanctions pressure.
Greek operators are taking an important role in maintaining Ural crude oil exports, with their participation level having reached almost 50% of total Ural production by June 2025.
While the end of seasonal refinery maintenance may also pressure Urals exports, the withdrawal of Greek commercial operators remains an important pressure point for Urals lift from Western Russia in the short term.
Ballast ship overhaul suggests extension of supply chain
On the import side, Russian crude oil arrivals by sea (excluding CPC and KEBCO) rose by 20% m/m to India and fell by 12% to China in November (1-24). The higher arrivals to India likely stemmed from a push to receive cargoes loaded in September and October before the November 21 deadline.
Meanwhile, the movement of ships in the West Russian crude ballast shipping lane signaled an extension of the supply chain.
The number of tankers returning to Western Russia after unloading fell by 10 percentage points for loaders in September compared with August. Notably, 8% of tankers loading in September (including the Arctic shipping region; excluding CPC, KEBCO mix) ballast to Duqm, Oman.
This pattern indicates initial constraints on the availability of ballast tonnage in Western Russia and the potential for expansion of the Russian oil supply chain, reflected in the increasing buildup of vessels in the ship-to-ship (STS) transfer area. The first STS delivery in the Middle East Gulf with a cargo of Russian crude oil occurred in May 2024.
In addition, 20% of loaders in October headed for the Suez Canal area after being dropped off in China or India. While this number may also include vessels en route to Russian loading sites in the Baltic and Black Seas, the buildup of tankers loading Russian crude in parallel (see below) may further suggest the use of STS chains, especially as the Gulf of Suez STS zone has recently become a popular location for Russian crude oil shipments.
What is next?
In the short to medium term, Russia will likely face challenges in maintaining its crude oil exports at a high level, especially from the West. There are early signs of limited tonnage amid increasingly stretched supply chains. But new ships entering the Russian crude oil trade could ease those tensions.
While it remains to be seen whether new practices emerge in Russia’s oil supply chain, early signs of ship accumulation in the Mediterranean Gulf zone and the Middle East could signal increasing reliance on the STS network to maintain trade.
Alternatively, if new players take over the business from Lukoil and Rosneft in a credible manner, we may see those volumes continue to flow via direct shipping, including via Greek-operated vessels, taking advantage of price capping mechanisms.
Source: vortex
