Not with us, and not against us: the rise of the strategic recovery

At the Rio de Janeiro Etamarati Palace, Brazilian President Luiz Inosio Lula da Silva raised quiet elites. There was no anti-American speech, nor resounding ads-just an invitation to “cooperate without coercion.” With the gathering of the BRICS leaders on July 6-7, 2025, the message was unambiguous: this was not related to the replacement of the United States, but about the creation of an area of it.

In President Trump’s second state, global diplomacy does not erupt to confrontation. It slides into something quieter, more intentional and perhaps more permanent-strategic recovery.

This is not the return of competing with the Cold War. It is the rise of what is called the polygamy-or-acting policy makers clearly. From Brazilia to Jakarta, Ankara to Nairobi, governments no longer organize their foreign policy. They organize it around the leverage.

Instead of forming alternatives based on the bloc or pledged allegiance to the competing authorities, these countries play the stadium-the involvement of Washington where it is useful, where bejing is where the strategy, and building new horizontal alliances among them. It is not anti -America. It is a strategic flexibility.

The last BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro presented a quiet and elegant demonstration. While some expected fireworks or a dark fireworks are hostile to the West, the bloc instead released the “Rio de Janeiro Declaration”, a 31 -page document calling for the reform of the United Nations institutions, Berbon Woods, the rule of moral artificial intelligence, and the increase in climate financing, while condemning attacks on Iran and support for Jazz. The announcement has been significantly announced the anti -US speech.

Lula, who hosted the summit, explained the spirit of the bloc: BRICS, as he said, is not a tool for confrontation but a platform for reform, drawing inspired by the 1955 Bandung Conference. Lola confirmed “equal” between the major powers and the position that was confirmed by Brazil non -alignment.

Brazil’s behavior reflects this budget action. While hosting China and Russia and expanding Brex membership to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (with Saudi Arabia as a partner), Trump’s identification demands resisted without escalation of revenge. The Indian position repeats this contradiction. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to deepen defense cooperation with Washington, but also adopted the presidency of the BRICS Summit for the year 2026, defended the “humanitarian first” approach, and promoting trade with China and the United Arab Emirates, including the pledge of the three bilateral trade with Brazil. New Delhi now defines its foreign policy as a “sharing of issues”-hedging in a practical way without ideological commitment.

Türkiye provides another clarification. While remaining a member of NATO and participating in US military purchases, Foreign Minister Ankara sent Hakan Vian to Rio, confirming Türkiye’s interest in the deepest BRICS cooperation. Turkish officials frame their diplomacy as “multi -directional”, building on the influence of Brussels to Baku without a fixed loyalty.

This is no longer a story. According to the Munich 2025 security report, 57 percent of global southern policies that are now included in the survey are described by their diplomacy as “multi-tool”-an increase of 21 points since 2020. These governments do not reject the United States or embrace their competitors. They diversify and calibrate their interests and isolates them.

Why now? The answer is in the living reality of Trump’s second chapter. His decisions in foreign policy sparked uncertainty, friction and eliminating the strategy-even between the old allies.

First, Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement on his first day in office. Quoting unfair burdens in the American industry, this step sent shock waves through global climate diplomacy – which led to the stopping of billions in climate financing and stopping the joint carbon work frameworks. In response, BRICS called for $ 300 billion annually by 2035 from developed countries to support the global southern climate goals.

Second, his management restored section 232 on steel and aluminum imports from 12 countries, including Brazil, South Africa, India and the European Union. By April, customs tariff rates ranged between 25 percent and 35 percent, prompting diplomatic protests and early signs of commercial revenge.

Third, Trump has stopped the United States’ contributions to the World Bank’s clean energy lending platform, and suspending America’s role in shaping development financing standards and accelerating alternatives between the southern global states.

Fourth, freezing diplomatic aid to non -NATO countries, describing them as “museum” under the doctrine of transactions. Governments in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America responded through a mutation towards regional solutions and partnerships.

The fifth – and perhaps the most stable – was Trump’s tariff strategy. On July 6, a 10 percent tariff was declared on all BRICS imports, starting from August 1, with escalation threats to 25 percent to 40 percent if bilateral deals fail, and 100 percent of customs tariffs if the BRICS countries reduce the use of the dollar. A 50 % tariff was imposed specifically on Brazil, noting that it hosts the alleged “attack” on American technology companies. The deadline of July 9 of the revised trade protocols, which bears the “DIF D-Day” brand, was extended to August 1, prompting emergency negotiations and capital trip.

According to recent International Monetary Fund estimates, direct foreign investment flows to the United States decreased by 6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2025. At the same time, Vietnam, Japan and Mexico began regional currency talks and commercial hedging mechanisms to reduce exposure to US sanctions.

In response, global southern countries are increasingly turning to each other – not out of hostility towards the United States, but out of necessity. Kenya and India have launched a joint climate credit platform.

Mexico and Colombia have expanded investment agreements with China and the United Arab Emirates, bypassing the dollar cutting systems. China and Vietnam have agreed to progress the railway cooperation, while China and the United Arab Emirates have referred to investments at the Brazil Forest Forest forever. The BRICS multilateral guarantee, launched by the New Development Bank, aims to enhance infrastructure and climate investment.

Even traditional Western partners rethink their foot. In an internal memorandum, the Foreign Ministry in Germany warned that Washington’s offer to partnership is shrinking. France held a strategic sovereignty dialogue with Brazil and Egypt. These are not alliances melt. They are alliances.

A certificate before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee this spring. “Washington’s dependence on loyalty has outperformed the leadership.”.

This is the essence of this new era: strategic self -rule is not ideological. It is adapted. Governments resist dependency, not relations. They refuse to exclusively – not to participate.

None of this is up to the anti -American mass. The global south does not want confrontation. She wants joint authorship. The expansion of the BRICS – which now represents 45 percent of the world’s population and 35 percent of GDP – is not a cold war. It is a forum for pluralism, not polarity.

This represents an opportunity. For the United States, the challenge is not a competition. It is a link. If Washington is able to adopt multiple diplomacy – based on mutual respect and institutional reform – they still carry driving tools. But if you continue to claim loyalty with fluctuations, it risks marginalization not by opponents, but by indifference.

In Trump’s second state, America is still important. But increasingly, the world is no longer waiting. The United States can still lead, but only by listening. You must join the new diplomatic schedule in the world – not asking for it.

Imran Khaled is a doctor and has a master’s degree in international relations.